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-vs-
DONALD LEE ROBERTSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
HON. J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
P. KEITH NELSON 
GEORGE SUTTON 
48 Post Office Place 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Respondant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA..q 
SHARRON KATHLEEN ROBERTSON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondant,) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
DONALD LEE ROBERTSON, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Civil No. 15719 
BRIEF OF RESPONDANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondant adopts Appellant's characterization of 
the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted plaintiff a decree of 
divorce from defendant and awarded her certain real and 
personal property. Defendant was awarded certain personal 
property and an equitable lien on the parties real property, 
and was ordered to pay child support and the debts incurred 
by the parties during their marriage except for the mortgage 
upon the parties' real property. Contrary to the statement 
contained in Appellant's brief, defendant was not ordered to 
oay alimony to the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondant adopts Appellant's characterization of 
the facts. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
trial court except in regard to vesting of appellant's equity 
in the parties' real property which respondent stipulates 
may be amended to provide for vesting eighteen (18) months 
following entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DEDUCTING FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S FAM-
ILY FROM THE GROSS EQUITY IN THE PARTIES' REAL PROPERTY. 
This Court recently described the standard applicable 
to appeal of a trial courts division of property in a divorce 
action as follows: 
The trial court, in a divorce 
action, has considerable latitude of 
discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interests. A party appealing 
therefrom has the burden to prove there 
was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the 
findings; or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
See also, Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491, 492 - 493 (Utah 
1975) which applies the same standard verbatim. 
Appellant attempts to meet this burden by arguing 
that the trial court abused its discretion in charging 
-2-
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defendant with the payment of loans which were unenforceable 
under the statute of limitations. Specifically, the Court 
found that plaintiff's family had loaned or counter-signed 
for loans to the plaintiff in the approximate sum of $7,500.00 
to help purchase and maintain the parties' real property. 
This sum was deducted from the gross equity in that real 
property and the balance was divided between the parties. 
The Court explained its reasoning as follows: 
The Twenty-four Hundred Dollars which 
has been paid down on the house seems 
to me, and I don't want to argue about 
it at this point and I may change my 
mind, but it seems to me that that 
ought to be a deductible from the 
equity, so that each of them are 
responsible for half of it. And the 
$395.00, there isn't any question 
about that. The amount paid to her 
mother for board and room or whatever 
it was during the period they lived 
there and the amounts advanced by her 
father and brother for living expenses, 
etc., it's true I think that if they 
were bringing the action there would 
be no recovery because I think it 
would be barred by the statute of 
limitations. On the other hand, in 
awarding, because he's in school 
studying diesel mechanics, etc., and 
she's foregoing alimony, it seems to 
me that maybe some kind of consider-
ation ought to be made in awarding her 
a little bit more of the equity in 
that house than him under those circum-
stances, since her people apparently 
have contributed more to it. (Tr. 
84). 
-3-
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This demonstrates that Appellant is wrong to characterize 
the Court's action as charging him with the payment of unen-
forceable loans. On the contrary, these loans were treated 
as contributions to the purchase and maintenance of the home 
and the court was merely denying the defendant an equal share 
of something to which he did not equally contribute. If 
these sums had been gifts or if the home had been inherited 
from the plaintiff's family, the Court would clearly not 
have abused its discretion in making such a deduction from 
the gross equity. Therefore, the technical enforceability 
of these loans is completely irrelevant and the Appellant's 
argument a misrepresentation of the trial court's actions. 
The statute of limitations argument is immaterial 
even if these contributions are viewed solely as loans. The 
mere fact that legal enforcement of these debts is time 
barred affects only that remedy, not their inherent validity 
or plaintiff's intent to repay them. Plaintiff's unrebutted 
testimony was that she regarded all such advances as loans 
to be repaid as soon as possible. (Tr. 12-19). If these 
loans are repaid, Respondent will have made a highly dispro-
portionate contribution to that which Appellant demands be 
shared equally. The fundamental unfairness of that result 
is obvious and renders the decision below the only distributior 
which would avoid inequity. 
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Appellant also fails to point out that certain of 
these loans must be permitted in any event since they are 
not barred by the statute of limitations. For example, one 
loan was from the plaintiff's brother, Ray Kier, and consists 
of a written second mortgage upon the parties' home, signed 
by both parties and recorded with the Uintah County Recorder. 
(Tr. 14 - 15). In another instance, respondant took a 
personal loan from Zions Bank in Vernal to pay delinquent 
mortgage payments and utility bills. This loan is in respondant's 
name alone, is co-signed by her father, E. L. "Jack" Kier, and 
was due in April, 1978. (Tr. 19). Nor is it clear that 
all remaining debts would be barred by the statute of limitations 
since the evidence was that many advances were made in small 
amounts over 11 • • the past five or six years. . . 11 (Tr. 
14, line 2) and it is not possible to determine with accuracy 
what sums were advanced beyond the statutory period. 
Defendant at no time denied that these sums were 
advanced by plaintiff's family. He admitted that plaintiff's 
father gave them money to use for a down-payment on their 
first house, that plaintiff's mother gave them board and 
room for approximately one year and that he signed the 
second mortgage note to plaintiff's brother. In regard to 
the remainder he denied only that he was aware of the advances 
or that he received any of it. (Tr. 36 - 37). Viewing 
defendant's testimony as a whole, it is clear that his 
-5-
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denial is based on a lack of knowledge, not a specific 
awareness that any loan was not made. The defendant simply 
did not bother himself with the family's financial affairs 
to such an extent he didn't even know how much money he made 
when working for Tomahawk Trucking, his employment while the 
parties resided in Vernal. (Tr. 37). 
The situation herein would be different if the 
court had actually specified these debts and ordered the 
defendant to assume responsibility for their payment. But 
the fact is, that the Court did not. Instead, it merely 
stated that it was not inclined to award the defendant half 
the equity in something to which he did not equally contribute 
Under the rule in English, Supra, this does not point to an 
abuse of discretion or any other reason for reversing the 
decision below. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ER..~ IN SIGNING THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONTAINING PROVISIONS AT VARI-
ANCE WITH THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
Prior to and during trial the parties had dis-
cussed a formula for vesting defendant with any equity he 
might be awarded in the parties' home and it was the impressic:, 
I 
of plaintiff's counsel that agreement had been reached that 
such equity would become due and payable when plaintiff 
remarried, sold the home, or the children both reached a 
-6-
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certain age, whichever occurred first. Defense counsel 
himself proposed that formula at the hearing in an appar-
ently unrecorded portion of the proceeding. The Court's 
subsequent Memorandum Decision provided for vesting of the 
equity 18 months following the entry of the decree. Plain-
tiff's counsel thought that the Court did not understand the 
parties' agreement on this point and so contacted Judge Bullock 
by phone who stated that if counsel for defendant agreed to 
using the parties' formula the Court would go along. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were then drawn 
according to the parties' formula and submitted to defense 
counsel on February 6, 1978 with a cover letter indicating 
the originals had not been sent pending his review and 
approval. Defense counsel did not respond and Judge Bullock 
signed these papers on February 21, 1978. Defense counsel 
did eventually notify the plaintiff of his objection to the 
modification in a letter dated March 28, 1978, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Plaintiff replied 
by letter on March 30, 1978, stipulating to restoring 
the terms outlined in the Court's Memorandum Decision. A 
copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
Defense counsel made no response until filing of Appellant's 
brief herein where it is alleged that plaintiff refused to 
so stipulate. 
The plaintiff's stipulation has not been withdrawn 
and no objection is made at this time--or has been at any 
-7-
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other time--to providing that defendant's equity shall 
become due and payable 18 months following entry of the 
Decree of Divorce as provided in the courts Memorandum 
Decision. 
SUMMARY 
The decision of the trial court to deduct contri-
butions from the plaintiff's family from the gross equity in 
the parties' real property was not an abuse of discretion 
and so must be sustained on appeal. The Appellant's argument 
that these deductions were improper because they reflected 
debts barred by the statute of limitation is invalid because 
the defendant was not being charged with payment of these 
debts at all. Rather, he was being denied a right to share 
equally in something to which he did not equally contribute. 
The Appellant has previously stipulated to a modification of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce to provide that defendant's equity in the parties' 
real property shall vest 18 months following entry of the 
Decree of Divorce so this is a point not in dispute at this 
time. Since the deduction of plaintiff's family's contri-
butions should not be reversed and plaintiff agreed to the 
modification sought by defendant regarding vesting of the 
equity awarded, costs should be awarded to the Respondant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P. KEITH NELSON 
-8-
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GEORGE R. SUTTON 
Attorneys for Respondant 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILING CETIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondant to Paul N. 
Cotro-Manes, Attorney for Appellant, 430 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this 
day of 
-9-
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EXHIBIT "A" 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY 
_Att,,rn~'tJ at of!aw 
SUITE 430 JUDGE BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
PHONE (801) S31.1300 
. COTRO-MANES (19:Z2-198°"') 
p. N COTRO-MANES March 28, 1978 WILLIAM J. M. 0ALGLIESH JOHN c. G"EEN 
rE WARR RANDY $. LUDLOW 
~ FANKHAUSER 
,~tH N BEASLEY 
BRUCE W. SHAND 
George R. Sutton, Esq. 
Nelson, Harding, Richards, Leonard & Tate 
Attorneys at Law 
48 P. 0. Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Dear Mr. Sutton: 
We are in receipt of your letter of March 22, 1978, and the 
enclosed stipulation. 
As the matter has been appealed to the Supreme Court for 
the State of Utah, we do not believe that the Court has 
any jurisdiction to hear your proposed motion to modify 
the decree of divorce. 
With respect to the order to show cause for failure to 
comply, we have advised our client immediately to make 
sure that the blanket together with the photographs are 
returned to Mrs. Robertson and that he get the child 
support current. 
You will recall that I talked with you relative to the decree 
of divorce in the first place which was unilaterally 
modified from the Judge's memorandum decision with respect 
to the house and the equity therein. We never did hear 
back from you relative to modifying the decree back to 
what the Judge ruled in his memorandum decision. 
My client does not wish to file a joint tax return, and we 
do not believe that the court has jurisdiction to order 
him to do so, as this is a matter involving the Internal 
Revenue Service and the laws of the United States, and not 
the divorce court. 
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George R. Sutton,Esq. -2- 3/28/78 
Be it as it may, as the matter is on appeal, the Court has 
no jurisdiction to modify its decree. 
Very truly yours, 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER & BEASLE' I 
PNC: jh 
V) / / ! 
~- - ~'., !.<l ~; . {d"'-1!, , 
v P~~l N. Cotro-Manes ,{ 
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~IRK W BENNETT 
~csEAr w. BRANOT 
.,. aNT CHMllSTOPHERSON 
: ~ICK J. HAl..L 
'OE-"NIS V. HASLAM 
C£CIL R. HEDGER 
~MICHAEL. JORGENSEN 
~oeEAT w. MILLER 
~ t'.EITH NELSON 
WILl..IAM S. RJCHAROS 
,. I WIL\..l.A.M /'1. RUTTER 
: I GEORGE A.SUTTON 
I H~OMAS M. ZAR A 
EXHIBIT "B" 
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, LEONARD & TATE 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
48 POST OFFICE PLACE 
P. 0. BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE: CITY, UTAH 64110 
(801) 531-1777 
March 30, 1978 
Mr. Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: 
Dear Paul: 
Robertson vs. Robertson 
2'3•:> C01.o~ .. oo STATE E!!.Al'>I\ BLOC.. 
1600 E>i=iOAow.n 
OENVEP.CO .. Oo:tAoo eczo2 
1100 .,.,u,.. eun .. 01,..0 
SU•TE 3'300 
"'"OUSTON, TEXA~ 7700Z 
500 Tt-IE ATAIU.'4 
1200 N STREET 
P. o. eox ezoza 
UNCOLN, NEBRASKA 68501 
820 NEl!llUS.U. SAVINGS &LOG. 
1&23 ,.AANAM STREET 
0""'AHA,NEl!AA5KA 5$102 
SUITE 230 
1919 H STAEl!T N,W. 
WASMl...OTON,O.c.zoooa 
Responding to your letter of March 28, it is my impression 
af~er reading rule 73(d) that only a supersedeas bond will stay 
a Judgment on appeal. If so, then the present decree is in 
effect and therefore subject to modification. In addition, the 
court retains jurisdiction over the divorce itself and can make 
additional rulings it deems proper despite the appeal. Accordingly, 
we intend to submit our petition at this time. 
In regard to Don and Sherrie's income tax returns, I agree 
that a Utah District Court cannot specify the manner in which a 
Federal Income Tax Return shall be filed. Whether they file 
jointly or separately might well be a moot point anyway since 
their deductions could be great enough to result in a complete 
refund of all withholding either way. However, I disagree that 
the court has no authority over the refund. It is certainly our 
intent to seek an award of the full amount or an equitable portion 
thereof. Moreover, if Don does not want to file a joint return 
so as to realize the greatest possible refund, you should advise 
him that Sherrie will claim all deductions pertaining to the 
house when filing her individual return. While so doing she will 
advise the IRS that Don might also be claiming the same deductions, 
but that she considers them to be rightfully hers alone. This 
information would be provided for the sole purpose of eliminating 
any su-spicion by the IRS of fraud or bad faith on her part. 
Another matter has come up in the interim which we must 
add to the Petition for Modification and the Order to Show Cause. 
Last Saturday, March 25, an agent of the Salt Lake Teacher's Credit 
Union appeared at Sherrie's house to repossess her car for nonpay-
ment of a loan which she and Don took out to purchase a truck for 
him some years back. Sherrie owned this automobile free and clear 
at that time and they offered it as collateral. Defaults were 
numerous and the truck was eventually repossessed but left an 
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Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq. 
March 30, 1978 
Page 2 
$800. 00 deficiency when resold. The car was not actually repos- I 
sessed because it is not presently operable, and arrangements have! 
now been made with the credit union to have Tex Gines assume 
full responsibility for that loan in exchange for more time to 
avoid repossession. Since under the terms of the decree this is! 
Don's debt, we will ask that the court charge this balance to his, 
equity in the house and relieve him of further responsibility. 
At the same time, we will ask the court to caution Don about 
possible future contempt for failure to pay these debts pursu~t 
to the decree. 
Finally, I disagree that our modification of the judge's 
decree was "unilateral". I was suprised when I read that 
provision in Judge Bullock's Memorandum Decision since, to my 
recollection, your proposals regarding the house equity through-
out the trial were those which we wrote into the final decree. 
As such, this struck me as a misunderstanding on the judge's part 
To insure that was the case I sent you a copy of all the proposed. 
documents for your review and corranent before sending the original1 
to the judge. I also stated the date when I would mail the 
original so you could comment before that time, but heard nothini 
from you until some time later. Your lack of response lead me to 
assume that you had no objection. Be that as it may, we have no 
serious objection to going back to the judge's original idea 
regarding the equity and will so stipulate if you will draw up 
the necessary papers. I 
Since it appears that we will at least have to argue whether 
the court has authority to modify its decree while the appeal I 
is pending, I would again request that you sign the stipulation 
allowing these hearings to be held in Provo and return it to 
me within five (5) days of this letter. Otherwise, I will schedu 
the hearing for Vernal at the earliest opportunity. 
GRS: clj 
Sincerely, 
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, 
LEONARD & TATE 
George Sutton 
Attorney at Law I 
' I
I 
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